


Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180065-0

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. DULLES

DATE: 7 May 1952

FROM :



SUBJECT: Revised Draft of DCI Memo to the President in re Gray Report

Before reading the subject memo which I delivered to you yesterday with related papers, will you please read the attached memo from Mr. Wisner to me. This states the revisions which the Directed wanted, and I have sought to effect in the subject memo. As I told you orally, and Mr. Wisner's unsigned memo to the Director states, it will be difficult to effect these revisions within the terms of the organizational directive for the PSB and in harmony with the Bureau of the Budget report, as the Director wanted.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

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MEMORANDUM FOR: 

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Proposed Memorandum for the President Concerning
PSB organization and responsibilities.

1. Attached hereto are the following documents:

a. Draft of memorandum prepared by the Director and based on our original submission to him.

b. Copy of draft of proposed report by the Bureau of the Budget to the President dealing with the organization of the PSB.

2. The following actions are requested of us by the Director: Prepare a revised draft of the Director's draft to take into account and reflect the following points and recommendations --

a. Condense the Director's draft through the elimination of most of the reasons for non-publication of the report, substituting for the deleted portion an indication that the President has taken care of the matter of publication through his letter to Mr. Gray.

b. Provide in the revised draft that the PSB Director may be a member of the Board, taking his turn with the other members in the rotation of the Chairmanship; or in the alternative that he need not be a member of the Board but may take his turn with the members as Chairman -- thus rendering it unnecessary to change the present directive which appears in most other respects to be satisfactory in its present form and to require no immediate changes.

c. Provide in the Director's draft that the PSB Director may attend NSC meetings as required and pursuant to invitation by the Executive Secretary of the NSC.

d. Provide in the Director's draft that a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, possibly the Chairman, will be invited to sit with the Board as a consultant and advisor.

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e. Examine carefully the Bureau of the Budget draft (which the Director has looked over and which he believes to be generally satisfactory) and make any slight changes in the Director's draft which may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the Bureau of the Budget draft.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER

Attached:

1. Draft of memo to Pres.
from DCI
2. Memo, dtd 1 May, to DCI fr Elmer B. Staats, Ass't Dir. B/B, enclosing his draft report to Pres. re Organization of the PSB.

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT: Budget Bureau Report on Psychological Strategy Board

From our conversation regarding the draft report by the Bureau of the Budget on the organization and operation of the Psychological Strategy Board, I understand that you are in general agreement with the specific recommendations in the body of the report with the exception of the third item at the top of page 4 and the accentuation given to the first two items on the same page. The arguments supporting these recommendations are touched on throughout the report and are further stressed by their inclusion in the proposed draft of the President's memorandum to the Board in paragraph 1.

It is these two points with which I take issue. In essence they deal with the Board's responsibility for "forward planning" to the exclusion of efforts to be devoted to current psychological challenges and opportunities; and with the Board's function with respect to coordination. I cannot agree with the author's reasoning, conclusions or recommendations in these matters. Unfortunately, the Bureau of the Budget concept runs through the whole report, including words put in the President's mouth in the draft of his memorandum to the Board. Also in the draft memorandum to the President is the statement that the Board concurs in these "changes".

It would be unfortunate to have the Board or its individual members concur in the report as phrased or seem to concur in the emasculating tone of the report. If the Board's functions have no more dynamic character than conceived by the Bureau of the Budget, then I strenuously contest the implications in the fuzzy statement that "The Budget Bureau's report in general supports the directive which you issued last year and the modifications are designed to strengthen it as an instrument for achieving more effective planning through the organized utilization of the resources of the three participating agencies, rather than as an instrument of independent staff work and advice to the President".

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I strongly recommend that the Board prepare an agreed rebuttal to certain features of the report and include a positive statement of what they conceive their responsibilities to be in the matter of coordination on the national level and the relative urgencies of long-range planning as against current psychological effort.

To enlarge on the subject in support of the foregoing recommendation, admittedly the Board (and its staff) is responsible for long-range planning and for the evaluation of the national psychological effort. Likewise, its responsibility for coordinating the national effort is both explicit and implicit in the Directive of 4 April 1951. All planning and programming is in essence the coordination of resources so that these resources may be so applied as to get the full cumulative effect in achieving our objectives. If this means anything it means that a strategic plan or program is designed to mobilize the disparate and specialized resources of the several operating departments and agencies for an integrated national effort. The operating departments and agencies cannot coordinate themselves as is suggested in this report. One of the clearest-cut reasons for the establishment of PSB was to create a extra-departmental mechanism for doing what the operating agencies individually or collectively can accomplish only laboriously, if at all.

This argument has nothing to do with independent powers of the Board or with its degree of authority; it merely asserts that the Board does have explicit functions, the most important of which is that of coordination on the national level. That, I repeat, is essentially what planning and programming means.

However, there is no justification for the iterated suggestion by the Bureau of the Budget that the Board (and its staff) is restricted by the President's Directive to long-range planning. We are in the midst of a world-wide campaign of psychological operations. The cold war is a fact and the men in the Kremlin are at present the arbiters of its tempo and intensity. It changes from day to day and the Board cannot avoid its current pressures. Eisenhower is not to be criticized on the score of diversion from his long-range effort in the direction of Berlin by throwing Bradley and Montgomery against the Bulge. If the Board disregards the demands of the current fight by permitting its best energies to be absorbed in long-range planning, then the Board is dealing with abstractions; the cold war will be lost and the vital reason for establishing the Board will have disappeared.

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This does not mean that the Board does not have responsibility for long-range studies in the formulation of sound policies, objectives and programs. But that is far from saying that this is an exclusive function.

John Magruder

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